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Civil wars evoke images of violence, destruction, collapse of governance, and 
disorder. Intrastate conflicts do indeed shatter existing socio-political orders; at the 
same time, they also create alternative orders where state and nonstate actors compete 
for power and legitimacy. Civil warfare produces multiple zones of contestation 
where authority is ambiguous, plural, and malleable, and where sovereignty, in 
practice rather than in principle, is divisible. In countries torn asunder by internal 
violence, myriad forms of authority contestation emerge at the local, regional, or 
national levels. Governments are challenged by a host of authority claimants: rebels, 
militias, warlords, criminal syndicates, or customary organizations. Civil warfare 
opens up multiple sites of contention where competing structures of authority 
intersect, overlap, and produce different kinds of political outcomes. The post-civil 
war environment is equally volatile, as various actors jockey for supremacy in a 
rugged authority landscape.    
Each of the four books discussed in this essay recount different, but related, 
“stories” of authority fragmentation during and after civil war. Taken together, they 
ensnare and enthral through theoretical finesse, methodological complexity, and 
practical relevance. All four go beyond the folk image of rebels as ruthless violence 
entrepreneurs or roving bandits, and explore the conditions under which armed 
nonstate actors savvily adapt to rapid shifts in local power distributions, emerge as 
bulwarks against disorder in fluid conflict environments, establish and maintain 
parallel systems of governance, and institutionalize alternative forms of political order 
in the midst or aftermath of civil wars. Collectively, the four books reviewed herein 
explore three major themes that inform research on political ordering during or after 
civil war and on the behavior of armed nonstate actors.  
First, the books enhance our understanding of rebel governance, a concept that 
encompasses the range of coercive, extractive, and redistributive institutions 
established by separatist or anti-government insurgents who control territory. Rebel 
Governance and Rebelocracy, in particular, map out the various contexts in which 
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rebels decide to settle down, become rulers of their own domains, and establish 
complex architectures of local rule. In these two books, the authors explore why some 
rebels engage in governance activities (for example setting up separate executive, 
legislative, and judicial bodies or providing public services to the local population), 
while others are more restrained in their governance initiatives. The two volumes 
present us with a detailed account of the multi-faceted nature of rebel governance, 
which can be instituted against the sovereign state (i.e., where rebels effectively 
supplant the sovereign state and exercise de facto authority), with the sovereign state 
(i.e., where insurgents sometimes compete but oftentimes collude with the 
government in the provision of public goods), or where the sovereign state is absent 
(i.e., where the government is so weak that it cannot extend its authority beyond the 
capital and its immediate surroundings). Second, the books illuminate the complex 
nature of the competition among armed nonstate actors as well as the outcomes 
produced by this competition. Rebelocracy and Organized Violence reflect on how 
armed nonstate actors cohabit or fiercely compete with one another over territory, 
resources, and influence, and how they engage with the government during and after 
civil conflict. The two works thoughtfully demonstrate that the interactions between 
armed nonstate actors and the state, as well as among armed nonstate actors 
themselves, can yield a range of political outcomes. Third, the authors help us better 
grasp the production and institutionalization of informal or hybrid orders during and 
after civil conflict. Rebel Governance and Informal Orders explain how armed 
nonstate actors and community organizations navigate across tenuous political orders 
during and after conflict. From these two books, we learn a great deal about how 
fragile political order can be in (post) conflict environments and about how rebel or 
customary organizations can help spawn informal orders in what might otherwise be a 
bloody and chaotic environment.   
In the remainder of this essay, I will discuss each book in turn and identify the 
key contributions that the author(s) make to extant research. Finally, I will conclude 
by focusing on three avenues for future research on the behavior of armed nonstate 
actors.  
 
Rebel governance, armed nonstate actor competition, and informal orders 
 
Rebel Governance stands out among those few edited books that offer a coherent 
structure. The book is organized around six conceptual and theoretical questions: 1) 
What exactly is rebel governance (and, how does it differ from cognate phenomena)? 
2) Which factors facilitate or inhibit rebel governance? 3) How do rebel governments 
project authority and legitimacy through symbolism and political discourse? 4) How 
do group characteristics affect the type of rebel government that emerges? 5) How do 
civilians shape rebel governance? 6) How does the use of violence impact rebel 
governance? The first question is thoroughly addressed by Nelson Kasfir (Chapter 2) 
who provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of what rebel governance is 
and is not. Kasfir proposes that “rebel governance, at a minimum, means the 
organization of civilians within rebel-held territory for a public purpose. These 
purposes include rebel encouragement of civilian participation, provision of civilian 
administration, or organization of civilians for significant material gain. The presence 
of any aspect of one of these types of activities is sufficient to indicate governance” 
(p. 24). Kasfir delineates three scope conditions for rebel governance to occur: 
insurgents must hold territory (though territorial control can be variable, temporally 
and spatially); the area must be inhabited by a permanent population; rebels must 
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maintain a credible threat of force that would guarantee rule enforcement. Although 
Kasfir’s main goal is conceptual, he also identifies a series of factors that affect the 
variation in rebel governance: rebels’ ideologies, cultural beliefs, and social values; 
the goal of the insurgency (anti-government v secessionist); conflict duration; 
material endowments; intra-factional competition (pp. 39-42).  
The conditions that favor insurgent rule are more extensively discussed in 
Chapter 3, by Timothy Wickham-Crowley. Wickham-Crowley argues that the 
underlying, or structural, condition that favors the emergence of what he calls 
“counter-state formation” (p. 49) is the absence or erosion of sovereign state 
authority. According to Wickham-Crowley, predatory governments that suffer from 
an acute legitimacy crisis provide a fertile ground for the creation of alternative 
structures of authority. Wickham-Crowley’s overview of Latin American Cold War 
insurgencies reveals that rebel governance can be quite extensive. In addition to 
establishing basic institutions of taxation and public goods provision, various Latin 
American insurgents maintained separate schools, courts, and facilities and even 
protected the interests of coca growers or offered literacy services to indigenous 
populations. In this chapter, Wickham-Crowley not only offers short descriptive 
accounts of the variation in the degree of governance across Cold War Latin 
American insurgencies (pp. 65-69), but he also addresses a number of reasons that 
precipitate rebel governance collapse: military conquest by government forces; 
expansion of electoral competitiveness in insurgent-held areas; rebels’ inability to 
protect the local population from regime violence (pp. 63-64).  
In Chapter 4, Zachariah Mampilly eloquently argues that symbolic aspects of 
insurgent governance are as important as institutional ones for the consolidation of 
nonstate political authority. Mampilly suggests that symbolic practices serve both 
instrumental and normative objectives for rebel rulers: “symbolic processes reduce 
the need for a rebellion to use force to ensure compliance; in addition, they may 
increase civilian identification with the rebel government” (p. 74). Besides 
establishing formal coercive, extractive, and redistributive structures, insurgents 
perform a range of symbolic acts, like discourses, parades, and rallies, which help 
foster collective identities, generate local support, promote organizational cohesion, 
attract external support, and consolidate the institutionalization of insurgent rule. 
In Chapter 5, Bridget Coggins provides an illuminating account of rebel 
diplomacy. Although formal diplomatic practices are rarely available to armed 
nonstate actors and violence remains a common insurgent tactic, some rebels embrace 
diplomacy in order to pursue their strategic objectives. Coggins holds that rebels’ 
diplomatic practices typically target multiple audiences: individuals inside and outside 
the insurgent-held territory, international organizations, and third-party states. Using 
examples from various rebellions, Coggins persuasively argues that diplomacy is 
integral to insurgents’ governance efforts: diplomacy helps rebels accrue the 
resources necessary to maintain military mobilization and provide public goods to the 
local population. Additionally, diplomacy serves as a conduit for cultivating relations 
with international actors and bolstering the legitimacy of the rebel movement.   
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 examine how organizational characteristics, such as 
ideologies and doctrines, affect patterns of insurgent rule. In Chapter 6, Stathis 
Kalyvas employs the case of the Greek civil war to illustrate that the political identity 
of rebel groups can substantially impact governance outcomes. Kalyvas convincingly 
shows that communist Greek rebels were more successful at creating centralized 
quasi-governmental structures than conservative insurgents. In a similar vein, in 
Chapter 7, Bert Suykens compares two rebel groups in the same state (India) but with 
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different objectives, the secessionist Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland 
(NCSN) and the anti-government Naxalite Communist Party of India (CPI). Suykens 
shows that the two groups embraced different approaches to governance, which can 
be traced to their ideology: the former aimed to create a separate Naga state while the 
latter envisaged a nationwide revolution as the pathway towards an egalitarian 
socialist society. In Chapter 8, Kasper Hoffmann proposes a moral economy of rebel 
governance, an approach that places the emphasis on ideas rather than political 
institutions. Looking at the Mai Mai rebellion in Eastern Congo, Hoffmann discusses 
the processes through which local customs, ideas, and beliefs legitimized Mai Mai 
authority and moulded the nature of rebel rule.  
The subsequent three chapters investigate the complex relationship between 
civilians and insurgents. In Chapter 9, Ana Arjona argues that civilians in rebel-held 
territories are not passive actors, devoid of power and agency. Using Colombia as a 
case study, Arjona offers a gripping account of civilian behavior towards insurgent 
rule. Two key arguments are advanced: first, partial civilian resistance to rebel 
governance is common; and, second, extensive civilian resistance to rebel rule 
depends on the local population’s capacity for collection action. In turn, civilians’ 
capacity to mobilize is a function of the quality of pre-existing local institutions and 
the scope of rebel intervention in local affairs. The contributor of Chapter 10, Till 
Forster, analyzes the relationship between rebels and civilians in the city of Korhogo 
in Cote d’Ivoire. Forster focuses on insurgents’ redistributive and extractive activities 
(security provision and tax collection), and finds that local citizens’ agency 
fundamentally shaped how security was provided and tax collected. In Chapter 11, 
Shane Barter looks at the case of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, and 
demonstrates that GAM’s inclusion of religious education, as well as its promotion of 
human rights and democracy, expanded the range of GAM’s governance activities. 
The last section of the book examines the predatory side of rebel governance. In 
Chapter 12, Francisco Gutierrez-Sanin examines rebel militias in Medellin, Colombia. 
Sanin offers a lucid analytical narrative of how power vacuums allowed militias to 
exercise de facto control and engage in indiscriminate violence, often without 
impunity. Finally, in Chapter 13, William Reno traces the evolution of Charles 
Taylor’s rebel government in Liberia in the early 1990s, and shows how patronage 
politics and natural resource endowments created incentives for predatory rather than 
stationary rebel behavior.  
Altogether, the volume is remarkably coherent and sets out a clear agenda for 
theoretically grounded and empirically rigorous research on insurgent rule. The book 
is foundational for the establishment of a distinct research program on rebel 
governance. While the book addresses various facets of the phenomenon, several 
areas of inquiry await further exploration. First, scholarship on governance by armed 
nonstate actors would benefit from greater terminological clarity. The contributors to 
Rebel Governance employ various terms (rebel governance, rebel government, 
rebelocracy, counter-state formation, para-governmental organization, multiple 
sovereignty) interchangeably but it is not clear whether they capture the same 
phenomenon. Relatedly, conceptual boundaries remain imperfectly outlined. The 
minimalist definition adopted in this volume (“the organization of civilians within 
rebel-held territory for a public purpose”) is appropriate for capturing descriptively 
the range of behavioral repertoires across insurgencies spanning various regions and 
time periods. Empirically oriented scholars, however, may find this conceptualization 
less suitable for large-N or even qualitative inquiries. What kind of rebel activities fall 
under the broader governance umbrella? Is there a specific bundle of institutions (or 
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rebel practices) that is necessary and sufficient for rebel governance to be empirically 
observed? Are coercive, extractive, and redistributive institutions equally important 
for assessing the presence and degree of rebel governance? Does one type or category 
of institutions established by rebels matter more than others? Are rational-
bureaucratic institutions and symbolic practices equally consequential when trying to 
empirically gauge insurgent governance? Second, an underlying assumption in this 
volume posits that rebel governance occurs when insurgents control territory. Prima 
facie, this assumption looks intuitive – how can one govern in a permanently 
contested space? Yet, the empirical record suggest that many rebel organizations, 
such as Hezbollah or the Kosovo Liberation Army, for example, engaged in extensive 
governance activities without securing exclusive territorial control. Territorial control 
seems to be a critical variable that affects the degree of rebel governance rather than 
its presence. Finally, this volume mainly focuses on insurgent governance during civil 
war. In certain situations, however, rebel governance predates the onset of violence 
(and can trigger the onset of war) and many rebels continue to provide governance 
after the guns fall silent. The effect of wartime violence and (negative) peace on 
rebels’ governance practices remains an empirical question, one that awaits further 
inquiry. 
Insurgents’ governance practices are extensively explored by Ana Arjona in 
Rebelocracy. In this book, Arjona undertakes a monumental task as she provides a 
thorough conceptual, theoretical, and empirical examination of social order during 
civil war. Conceptually, she argues that the interaction between insurgents and 
civilians typically produces three types of outcomes: disorder (internal anarchy), 
rebelocracy (extensive rebel intervention in local affairs), or aliocracy (minimalist 
insurgent interference in local affairs). Theoretically, she posits that the type of order 
emerging in conflict zones is a function of two main factors: rebels’ time horizon or 
discount rate (which affects the extent of rebel intervention in local affairs) and the 
quality of pre-existing institutions (especially the quality of dispute adjudication 
structures).  
The theory produces a range of testable expectations (Chapter 3). First, 
disorder is most common when armed groups’ time horizons are short (when rebels 
discount the future at a higher rate). Short time horizons are most likely when 
insurgent groups are indisciplined or face armed competition with the government or 
other rebels. Second, long time horizons (which are most likely in an environment of 
high organizational discipline and low inter-group competition) can yield two 
outcomes, depending on the quality of pre-existing institutions. Where high-quality 
institutions are present, civilians have considerable bargaining leverage and aliocracy 
is the most probable outcome. By contrast, low-quality local institutions reduce 
civilians’ capacity for collective mobilization and resistance against rebel rule; in this 
case, rebelocracy is the most likely form of social order. Empirically, Arjona employs 
an impressive methodological arsenal – statistical analysis of original data (collected 
through surveys, interviews, in-depth case studies, and memory workshops), process 
tracing, and natural experiments – to test, in the context of the Colombian conflict, not 
only the main implications of the theory but also its microfoundations. 
The book flows seamlessly. After having laid out the theoretical framework in 
Chapter 3 and discussed the staggering array of methods used to collect the empirical 
evidence in Chapter 4, in the subsequent chapters Arjona tests the key implications of 
the theory. Building on original data at the local level, Chapter 5 investigates the type 
of social orders that emerged across Colombian communities in war zones between 
1970 and 2012. The empirical evidence (Arjona employs multi-level models on a 
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panel dataset of community-armed group dyads) is broadly consonant with the 
theoretical expectations: insurgent indiscipline and armed competition are most likely 
to produce disorder; rebelocracy, or insurgent rule, is less likely to materialize where 
communities display legitimate and effective local institutions (especially dispute-
adjudication institutions). Chapter 6 unpacks the mechanisms through which 
insurgent indiscipline, armed competition, local institutions, and the value of disputed 
territories affect the types of social orders that emerge in civil war environments. 
Chapter 7 offers a thorough examination of the processes through which the quality of 
local institutions shapes civilians’ capacity for collective mobilization and creates 
propitious conditions for aliocracy (rule by others or shared civilian-rebel rule). Here, 
Arjona relies on a natural experiment to ascertain the effect of institutional quality on 
social order. Specifically, she analyzes three similar communities in the same 
municipality (Viola in central Colombia). These three villages experienced different 
institutional transformations in the 1960s, which eventually shaped the type of social 
order that emerged in the 1990s when the municipality fell under rebel control. 
Finally, Chapter 8 probes the microfoundations of the theory by investigating the 
effect of rebelocracy on recruitment. Using novel quantitative and qualitative data, 
Arjona finds that high-quality local institutions are negatively correlated with 
recruitment (local civilians were less likely to join rebel groups under aliocracy than 
under rebelocracy). 
Overall, Rebelocracy is a veritable tour de force, conceptually, theoretically, 
and empirically. The range of questions examined in a book-length manuscript is 
daunting, the multi-method approach is impressive, and the descriptive material is 
illuminating. The author’s capacity for analytical breadth and depth is truly 
remarkable. Detecting major shortcomings in this study is tantamount to looking for 
the needle in the haystack. Arjona offers a compelling account of the architecture of 
rebel rule in Colombia and is meticulous about anticipating and addressing potential 
challenges to the theory and methodology. That said, a few avenues for future 
exploration stand out.  
One relates to the theory’s portability outside the Colombian context. 
Although the author is careful to provide vignettes from other civil conflicts that seem 
to support the posited mechanisms, external validity remains an empirical question. 
Another refers to transitions in social orders. Civil war orders often change more 
frequently than seemingly afforded by the framework developed in this book. The 
transition from one type of order to another, especially from rebelocracy to aliocracy, 
requires further theorizing and empirical testing. Arjona’s theory elucidates how the 
quality of pre-existing institutions shapes the cross-sectional creation of a given type 
of order (rebelocracy if local institutions are weak or aliocracy if local institutions are 
strong); however, the framework looks indeterminate vis-à-vis the cross-temporal 
change in social orders. The quality of local institutions – a slow-moving, or even 
time-invariant, variable – cannot fully capture rapid transitions in local orders that 
characterize so many civil wars. Another aspect necessitating more attention is the 
role of the state. As the framework developed by Arjona privileges the local 
community-rebel actor interaction, one might think that the state is an agentless, 
passive actor in the production of local orders. The author, however, is careful to 
argue that state agency is captured by the theory in several ways (pp. 78-79): the 
state’s presence affects the likelihood that rebels secure territorial control; the state 
can create armed competition; the state shapes the quality of pre-existing local 
institutions; the state is directly involved in the creation of social order. Since Arjona 
focuses primarily on how the community-rebel group interaction yields varying types 
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of social orders, the last point requires further development. Particularly understudied 
are the conditions under which hybrid forms of governance emerge where the state 
colludes with rebel actors in the provision of public order and goods. Hence, more 
work is needed on the entire range of aliocratic social orders where the state is more 
present or more directly invested in the production of local orders. 
While Arjona subtly dissects the anatomy of social orders during civil war, in 
Organized Violence after Civil War, Daly Zukerman maps out the contested nature of 
authority in the aftermath of internal conflict. Also focusing on the Colombia 
“laboratory” (which offers tremendous variation in rebels’ post-war trajectories), the 
author examines why some armed groups lay down weapons while others remilitarize 
after peace agreements. According to Daly Zuckerman, the key explanatory factor for 
the variation in rebel remilitarization is the geography of rebel recruitment: groups 
that recruit locally tend to remain cohesive at the end of the war while groups that 
recruit further afield tend to disperse. The geography of rebel recruitment shapes the 
power distribution and informational asymmetry in the post-war environment, and 
affects the likelihood of remilitarization: configurations that include only local groups 
display stable balances of power and informational symmetries, and are more likely to 
demilitarize over time; by contrast, configurations with non-local groups exhibit 
changes in power balance and informational asymmetries, and are more likely to 
remilitarize after a peace accord.  
In essence, Daly Zukerman views post-conflict bargaining failures and 
remilitarization as a by-product of informational problems that are triggered by 
rebels’ recruitment patterns. The rationalist explanation for post-conflict militia 
remilitarization is thoughtful and parsimonious while the evidence amassed to test the 
main theoretical propositions is extensive. To evaluate the main argument, Daly 
Zukerman embarked on fieldwork in Colombia over a seven-year period (2006-2013), 
conducted over 300 interviews with “ex-combatants, victims, military personnel, 
civilians, politicians, and experts on the armed conflict” (p. 8), analyzed surveys of 
demobilized combatants, psychologists, and community members, and collected 
organizational-level data on all militia factions as well as “geo-referenced data on 
29,000 violent events between 1964 and 2013” (p. 8). 
The book’s sections are logically woven into a lucid narrative. Chapter 2 
explains the causal chain that links the geography of recruitment to militia 
demobilization or remobilization in the post-war environment. Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of militia groups in the Colombian civil war. Chapter 4 offers a quantitative 
test of the main theoretical claim, with the evidence revealing a strong link between 
armed groups’ recruitment patterns and their post-conflict organizational capacity. 
Chapter 5 carries the large-N analysis further and uncovers a strong relationship 
between armed groups’ recruitment patterns and their trajectory towards militarization 
or demilitarization in the aftermath of the peace agreement. Here, Daly Zukerman is 
careful to consider a host of alternative explanations that might account for the 
variation in observed patterns of demilitarization and remilitarization (pp. 126-136). 
Chapters 6 and 7 provide qualitative evidence of the posited theoretical mechanisms: 
Chapter 6 examines the processes that led to the demilitarization of a militia group 
(Bloque Cacique Nutibara) in Colombia’s most-populated region, Antioquia. The case 
material captivates not only through descriptive finesse but also through analytical 
acumen as the author clarifies what type of case-level evidence would disprove the 
theory (pp. 139-140). Chapter 7 traces the remilitarization of local and non-local 
militias across various Colombian regions. Chapter 8 probes the theory’s external 
validity by applying the theoretical framework to earlier internal conflict in Colombia 
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during La Violencia (1948-1958) and to civil wars in other countries (Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Peru, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Indonesia). 
Altogether, Daly Zukerman’s carefully researched book offers a novel 
explanation for armed actors’ post-conflict behavior, and is a must-read for civil war 
scholars and Colombia specialists. The well-knit chapters provide a nuanced account 
of the circumstances under which rebels remilitarize after a peace deal is struck. As is 
the case with Rebelocracy, however, it remains to be seen whether the posited 
theoretical mechanisms operate in comparable contexts outside Colombia. The cross-
region case illustrations provided in Chapter 9 demonstrate the theory’s explanatory 
leverage beyond Colombia, but more systematic testing is needed (the empirical 
richness assembled in this book might be quite hard to replicate in other contexts). 
Finally, the author is right to claim that “the concept of information problems has not 
been rigorously applied to the intrastate arena” (p. 250), and that informational issues 
between and within armed groups “shed light on the puzzle of why demobilizing 
groups cannot resolve their territorial disputes without a return to violence” (p. 250). 
At the same time, it is not entirely clear whether the determining factor that produces 
bargaining failures – and, hence, remilitarization – with configurations that include 
non-local groups is informational asymmetry rather than credible commitment. While 
at the beginning of a conflict information about actors’ resolve and capabilities is 
relatively scarce (and belligerents have rational incentives to misrepresent this 
information), at the end of a protracted civil war – like the one in Colombia – 
informational asymmetries tend to be greatly reduced. It might be that the geography 
of recruitment produces a commitment problem rather than an informational problem: 
groups may retain abundant information about each other’s capabilities and resolve 
right after a peace deal is struck, but the loose network structure of non-local groups – 
their lack of internal cohesiveness – reduces their ability to credibly commit to 
agreements. Thus, the geography of rebel recruitment might operate to produce the 
outcomes anticipated by Daly Zukerman’s theory through a credible commitment 
mechanism rather than an informational mechanism. Future research should elucidate 
this conundrum. 
The last book reviewed here immerses the reader into a different post-war 
society: Afghanistan. In Informal Order, Murtazashvili Brick offers a captivating 
account of customary governance – governance provided by local actors – in 
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. Conventional wisdom holds that customary 
governance is at odds with the modern state; yet, the author’s analysis of post-conflict 
Afghanistan indicates not only that governance provided by local self-governing 
communities is quite common but also that customary and formal state actors often 
cooperate towards the provision of local public goods. The book’s theoretical 
contribution resides in a logical account of “the art of being differently governed” – 
that is, in the clear exposition of the conditions under which local communities 
successfully embark on governance activities when the state is absent or when state 
presence is minimal. Its empirical richness is rendered by the disaggregated 
community-level data that were assembled through fieldwork conducted in 
Afghanistan during a period of high uncertainty and great peril (2006-2008). Relying 
on over 300 interviews and focus groups with government officials in Kabul and in 32 
villages across 6 provinces, the book surveys a broad set of behavioral repertoires 
where civilians often organize local affairs in the absence of an effective state. 
Murtazashvili Brick argues that customary governance is no panacea for the 
consolidation of peaceful social orders in the aftermath of conflict, but it can produce 
different types of positive political outcomes. Customary governance “can enhance 
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public goods provision and may even improve political participation” (p. 5). Rather 
than completely undermining state authority, customary governance can also improve 
support for democracy and the central government (p. 4). Furthermore, “customary 
governance may actually improve long-term prospects for the rule of law because it 
serves as an obstacle for the state as it seeks to transgress citizens’ rights” (p. 6). 
Finally, customary governance can serve “as a source of defense against insurgents” 
(p. 6). The processes through which customary governance shapes political outcomes 
are explored across several carefully calibrated chapters that trace actor interactions in 
Afghanistan at three levels: within villages; between villages; between villages and 
the state.  
Chapter 2 provides an historical overview of the Afghan government’s 
ambivalent position towards customary governance. In Chapter 3, Murtazashvili 
Brick delineates the analytical contours of customary governance by illustrating that, 
in many Afghan villages, customary governance “exists as a shared responsibility 
between three distinct informal organizations: village councils (shuras/jirgas), 
religious judicial authority (mullahs), and community representatives (maliks)” (p. 
65). The subsequent two chapters deal with the political economy of public goods 
provision at the village level: Chapter 4 assesses customary organizations’ 
effectiveness in providing small-scale public goods within villages in the absence of 
an effective state, while Chapter 5 looks at the level of inter-village cooperation vis-à-
vis the provision of larger-scale public goods, such as local order and public 
infrastructure. Using survey evidence, Chapter 6 shows that the presence of local 
customary organizations is positively correlated with support for the state and 
democratic norms. Chapter 7 looks at the relationship between customary 
organizations and government authorities, and analyzes the range of informal power-
sharing arrangements that emerge out of that interaction.  
Overall, the book makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature 
on governance beyond the state. In Informal Order, Murtazashvili Brick convincingly 
argues that “there is often a substantial degree of order even in the absence of the 
state” (p. 24). The inquiry into customary governance in Afghanistan reveals that the 
relationship between the state and customary order is not zero-sum but highly 
complex. In some situations, customary organizations were able to successfully 
perform functions typically associated with sovereign statehood; in other situations, 
however, they had to collaborate with formal state actors in the provision of local 
order and other large-scale public goods. While the volume impresses through 
analytical breadth and depth, at least two aspects require greater attention. As with 
Rebel Governance, the conceptual boundaries of (customary) governance need to be 
more clearly specified. What exactly goes into the concept? When does customary 
governance actually begin and end? Without a priori conceptualization, customary 
governance will lie in the eye of the beholder – which is less of a problem for 
descriptive accounts but a real quandary for empirical projects. Relatedly, Informal 
Order nicely lays out the processes through which customary governance produces 
positive outcomes (public goods provision; consolidation of democratic norms). Yet, 
further research is needed on the conditions under which customary governance 
encourages predatory behavior. Future studies should explain how customary 
institutions can be compromised by both state and nonstate actors and used 







Countries torn apart by internal conflict – as well as countries struggling to escape the 
anvils of civil violence – are not orderless or ungoverned, but differently governed. In 
conflict-ridden or post-conflict societies, nonstate authority structures routinely fulfil 
functions commonly associated with sovereign statehood. Civil war and post-civil war 
environments are, above all, areas of contestation: about who rules, who governs, and 
what shape authority and governance take. The four books reviewed here provide 
theoretically grounded, empirically based, and policy relevant knowledge of the 
conditions under which armed nonstate actors mimic statelike functions during and in 
the aftermath of civil war. Collectively, they herald the emergence of a new phase in 
the study of authority, order, and governance in (post) conflict environments.  
In addition to theoretical ingenuity and empirical richness, these studies open 
up exciting theoretical and empirical terrains for in-depth inquiries into the complex 
nature of nonstate political authority in the contemporary international system. Three 
particular avenues for future inquiry look promising. First, the hybrid forms of 
governance that emerge during and after conflict require more systematic 
investigation. These four books show that sovereign governments reluctantly or 
voluntarily relinquish sovereign prerogatives to armed nonstate actors or local 
customary organizations. Why and how national governments cooperate with armed 
or nonviolent internal competitors has yet to be fully uncovered. Second, the four 
studies included in this review provide nuanced accounts of the incentives rebel 
organizations and local communities have to engage in governance activities against 
the state, with the state, or when the state is absent. After reading these books, one 
learns a great deal about the “supply side” of nonstate governance. However, the 
“demand side” of nonstate governance remains underexplored. Both the presence of 
nonstate governance and the form that it can take vary widely across and within civil 
wars. This variation could also be a function of civilian demand for rebel governance. 
The books included in this review seem to adopt a contractualist view of demand for 
nonstate governance which holds that governance by nonstate actors is often a better 
alternative, vis-à-vis contract enforcement and property rights guarantees, than 
anarchy or predatory government. The contractualist perspective is intuitively 
appealing but necessitates more rigorous testing in multiple contexts. Finally, more 
work is needed on the criminal aspects of civil warfare. Palimpsestic authority 
orderings – where the boundaries between the sovereign and the extra-legal, between 
the licit and unlawful are effaced – are quite common during and after civil war. All 
four books enrich our understanding of the criminal activities undertaken by rebel 
actors exhibiting diverse organizational characteristics and embracing various 
strategies; yet, little is known about the nexus between crime and the subnational, 
national, and cross-national variation in governance practices that emerge during and 
after civil war.     
 
 
